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We have reached a stage in our society's ongoing debate over ethically
controversial end-of-life decisions where such matters have been put up for public
vote. A Washington State initiative to legally permit physician-assisted suicide and
voluntary active euthanasia was defeated in November 1991 by 53% to 47%, but
supporters, heartened by the fact that the initiative received over 701,000 votes,
have announced plans to place similar proposals before citizens in California
(1992) and Oregon (1994). The expectations for ultimate success rely heavily on a
perception that such "right to die" or "death with dignity" initiatives reflect a
strong populist sentiment. In the forums of public discussion, the voices that have
come to the fore are those of terminally ill patients, and their families who have
become their principal caregivers, and these stories resonate with many other
persons who have come to see the Karen Ann Quinlans, Nancy Cruzans, and
Janet Adkins of the past 15 years as visible symbols of what it means to die in a
culture obsessed with the technological conquest of death.
The common parameters of the public debate are already familiar to us from
other contexts: the right of expanded choice is pitted against claims about the
sanctity of human life, thereby making the political polarization of the discussion
seem unavoidable. Nevertheless, it seems moraUy myopic to reduce the question
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oflegalized physician-assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia only to an issue of
the boundaries of public or state intervention in a private choice. The public policy
issue is merely the .most visible dimension of a dialogue that in fact engages
embedded questions of the deepest substantive significance and of ultimate
meaning: the nature of our lives, and our selves, the meaning of dependency, the
place of pain and suffering in life, the reality of finitude and death.
Such issues are not really problems to be "solved" by legislative fiat or a voter
referendum, but neither should they be bracketed out in debates over the
legalization of euthanasia. Indeed, only by attending to such questions can we
explain the nature of the fundamental differences of positions that emerge. In short,
raising these questions of ultimacy will render the debate over legalized euthanasia
more intelligible and, equally important, more honest.
The questions of ultimacy embedded in the euthanasia debate are common
questions of human meaning, and yet historically their most visible context of
reflection has been within religious traditions. It is not coincidental, I would
suggest, that there is a theological story to be about each of the symbols of modem
dying. The decisions about treatment of Karen Ann Quinlan were shaped by the
context of Roman Catholicism, those about Nancy Cruzan by a Methodist
background, and Janet Adkins sought out Dr. Jack Kevorkian after consulting
with her Unitarian minister. In very significant ways, religious themes and symbols
have been interwoven with the fabric of public discussion about the right to die
and legalized euthanasia.
In the following, then, I wish to consider the religious dimensions of euthanasia
as they bear on five embedded questions of ultimacy and meaning - control and
empowerment, the finite self, the gifted nature of life, suffering and compassion,
and the good death. Such themes indicate that in our care of the dying, there are
preferable alternatives to affirm the humanity of the dying and to relieve their pain
and suffering (the two principal arguments supporting legalized euthanasia), short
of resorting to taking their lives. In so doing, I hope to illustrate that the issue of
legalized euthanasia provides an illuminating way to examine the relevance of
religious themes to moral and civic discourse in the public square.
Religious Diversity
It is often intimated that the moral fault-lines over euthanasia reflect a secular
versus religious fissure. However, there is no monolithic religious position on
euthanasia (morally or legally), and indeed the diversity of religious positions is
rather striking. This diversity, which reflects instead the pluralism of American
religiosity in general, is manifest at several different levels of discussion.
The level of theological discussion displays a range of views, from a general
prohibition of euthanasia, to a permission in exceptional cases or circumstances, to
a permission as a matter of public policy, to even an obligatory response in cases of
extreme suffering.! Sometimes these differences reflect a general identification
with a particular tradition of religious ethics, but not always. While the Roman
Catholic Church, for example, has been vigorously opposed to assisted suicide and
legalized active euthanasia, some theologians, such as Lisa Cahill and Daniel
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Maguire, are willing to permit euthanasia within very limited or exceptional cases,
typically, a competent terminally ill patient who voluntarily requests euthanasia
and for whom there is no viable alternative to relieve extreme pain and suffering. 2
Protestant theologians such as Gilbert Meilaender and Allen Verhey, meanwhile,
argue for a conservative, prohibitory approach to eutha na sia,3 despite the
historical Protestant emphasis on freedom of personal choice.
A similar range of positions is evident in the resolutions regarding end-of-life
decisions adopted by "authoritative" ecclesiastical institutions. While it is the case
that the majority of denominational resolutions in the U.S. have affirmed
opposition to euthanasia, there are some, such as that approved in July 1991 by
the United Church of Christ, that see the morality of euthanasia resting in an
"individual decision" (current study documents in the United Methodist Church
and the Presbyterian Church also seem to move in this direction), while others,
such as in the Unitarian Universalist Assembly, are committed to seek changes in
laws to allow for assisted suicide and active euthanasia.4
The moral and policY weight that such resolutions carry is also open to question.
There is, in many instances, an evident disparity in positions articulated by an
institutionalized ecclesiastical body and those advanced by the lay members of the
tradition. One can no more infer what the position of any particular Roman
Catholic, or Episcopalian, Baptist, Methodist, Congregationalist, etc., on
euthanasia will be from a denominational resolution than one can the views of any
given professional caregiver from the official "opinions" of the American Medical
Association or the American Nursing Association.
Moreover, many resolutions speak primarily to an audience of the religious
community, and only secondarily, if at all, to the public policy question. To be
sure, resolutions that characterize euthanasia as "homicide" or "murder" have
fairly direct implications for legal sanctions. However, even the most vehement
denominational opposition to legalized euthanasia often will distinguish between
the act of euthanasia and the agent that requests euthanasia. While the act may be
forbidden, the patient may well be excused from moral and religious
responsibility, due to the underlying circumstances of pain and suffering.
Moreover, recommendations that an attitude of "compassion" or ''forgiveness'' be
adopted towards the patient, rather than "punishment," also may have policy
implications, as such language suggests a softening of a legalistic judgment in favor
of considering extenuating circumstances. Of course, such modification of moral
and legal judgment would not necessarily apply to a professional, such as a Dr.
Kevorkian, who engages in a practice of assisting in suicide.
Finally, diverse religiosity is also expressed in the private piety of individual
patients faced with end-of-life decisions. The biblical admonition that there is "a
time to die" provides a sense of comfort for many terminally ill patients, who
frequently acknowledge their impending death by expressing, in effect, that their
destiny is "in God's hands." Some patients, however, take a more active role, as
displayed by Marjorie Wantz, a Michigan woman with a painful pelvic disease
who asked Dr. Kevorkian to assist in her suicide: "If God won't come to me, I'm
going to find God."5 The voices of the ill, which have played such a powerful
public role in the debate over legalized euthanasia, are not, then, absent
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religious conviction.
Each of the manifestations of religious diversity suggest that it is misleading to
portray growing public interest in assisted suicide and active euthanasia as a sign of
a "godless" society that has lost its faith bearings. The problem is not so much loss
of faith in a secular society, but rather the context of modem dying. We are
rightfully concerned with where death occurs (typically in institutions experienced
as alien and impersonal); at what age (our life expectancy has increased in this
century from 47 to 74, but in its wake has come greater sickness and morbidity);
the causative disease (chronic diseases - the cancers, heart problems, strokes,
dementia - that extend the duration of the dying process); the degree of pain that
accompanies this protracted process; and, finally, the orientation of professional
caregivers towards curing rather than caring, meaning that patients may
experience as part of their dying the tyranny and terror of technology.
This modem context of dying has occasioned a theological re-thinking of
traditional religious views and norms regarding the sanctity and the dignity of
human life, and helps in part to explain the kinds of diversity present in religious
discourse about euthanasia. In the midst of such diversity, nevertheless, one can
identify some fairly common themes and unifying issues that reveal a dimension of
ultimacy embedded in the euthanasia debate.
Control and Empowennent

The public debate over euthanasia continuously makes reference to ideologies
of control and power. The greatest threat to the dignity and self-identity of
terminally ill patients, it is argued, is the experience of "loss of control," an
indignity that is especially assaulting because of the private and intimate nature of
one's dying. Patients fear losing control to technologies, to professionals, to the
state, and in some instances, to their families. (Caregivers themselves may well feel
"controlled" by the requests of patients, or their families, or the law and lurking
malpractice concerns, or more and more, economics and the cost of care). The
recourse is frequently a strong moral affirmation of the responsibility to respect
patient self-determination regarding end-of-life decisions, coupled with a quest for
legal "empowerment" through relevant advance directives. In a very fundamental
respect, the demand for "dignity" in dying is connected with having control over
and being able to manage one's dying.
The assertion of control and empowerment reveals some very paradoxical
features at the heart of practices of care for the dying. The experience of loss of
control has come just as the dominant traditions in medicine, the law, and ethics
have converged to form a consensus that patients ought to have control over their
dying. This is the point, after all, of all the legislation and case law regarding
advance directives since Quinlan, culminating in the "Patient Self-Determination
Act" that went into effect in December 1991, and requires all health care facilities
receiving federal funds to inform patients about advance directive upon admission.
There thus appears to be a profound disparity between what patients are
experiencing in the course of their dying and what they are supposed to be
experiencing.
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Yet, at the same time, the very experience of illness and more fundamentally the
process of aging-that inevitably culminates in death revealS that we are subject to
some kind of ultimate powers beyond our control. We perhaps aspire, through our
technology and knowledge, to a mastery of nature and the immortality of the gods,
but we cOntinually receive reminders of our limited and finite nature. We may
therefore experience these ultimate powers as arbitrary, as abusive, as cruel
-because we are deprived not only of what we have but also what we wish to be
-or as creative, nurturing, and preserving, but we cannot in any event help but
acknowledge that any "control" we assert over our dying is limited and qualified
with respect to these ultimate powers.
The religious dimensions of this sense of control by an ultimate Other are
displayed in the bedside expressions of "being in God's hands," or "letting God's
will be done"; or, it may be stated in more formal theological affirmations
regarding the "sovereignty" of the creator of human life over our death and destiny
as well. This appeal to "God's hands," "will," or "sovereignty" reflects not so much
the closure of the question at stake, but rather its context Patients, caregivers, and
families still have choices to make,lest this dimension of ultimacy become a guise
for fatalism. That is, it still is an intelligible question to ask whether patient choice
for death expresses or contradicts the basic sense of powers that are beyond our
control and ultimately sovereign.
Another way to frame this dimension is to ask whether patients who are
"empowered" with choices regarding end-of-life decisions also have accountability
for the content of that choice. Does a right to choose imply that all choices
regarding the bringing about of death are morally equal? While setting standards
for responsible choice seems an alien idea in a pluralistic culture, a core theme in
religious discourse about taking human life is accountability, to self and conscience,
to others, such as family or professional religious caregivers in medicine, and to an
ultimate Other. In evaluating proposals for legalized euthanasia, we might follow
the suggestions of some ethicists who see in the Just War tradition formal moral
criteria that have broad applicability to situations where the taking of human life is
contemplated.6 The case for legalized euthanasia, I submit, may meet many of
these criteria, but almost certainly fail the test of last resort.
The Finite Self

It is sometimes maintained that the fact of illness compromises personal
autonomy, that the experience of pain and suffering disables not only the body but
also the selfs capacities for informed decision making. Such a perception has
historically been important to justifications of medical paternalism. As well, it
surfaces in theological claims that a deliberate choice for death through suicide is
rationally compromised if not entirely irrational. Yet, the paradigm case for
voluntary euthanasia presents a patient who is fully autonomous and possesses
sufficient decision-making capacity, notwithstanding a condition of terminal
illness. It is evident then that an ethic of euthanasia presupposes a conception of the
nature of the self in the face of illness and death that is somewhat contrary to
conventional wisdom in medical and theological traditions. Since such an ethic
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places so much stress on patient self-determination, this conception of "self' bears
some scrutiny.
There is little reason to dispute that some deliberate choices for death are
carefully considered and continuously expressed. Some just as surely are not, but
are occasioned by depression, reversals of fortune, etc. An important safeguard is
to ensure that a patient's first words are not his or her last words: The demand for
death, if it is an authentic expression of the desires of the self, would be reiterated
over time. Such a view is implicit in our allowance for revocations of advance
directives. We know the self over time can change its mind, and respecting such
changes in this context is especially pertinent, since failure to heed a changed
treatment preference may lead to an irrevocable mistake.
We can also ask whether a patient's consistently expressed request to die may
well signify a form of isolation experienced by the dying person. The exemplary
patient of an ethic of euthanasia is a paradigm of individualism. We do not,
however, live our lives shorn of social relationships, and it is this social dimension
of the self that seems neglected by the stress on personal autonomy. The
autonomous self requesting assisted suicide or euthanasia is affirming
independence, when the character of our lives is marked by mutual dependency.
Thus, it is imperative to ask whether the care of the dying person has somehow
disrupted or severed the relational bonds and connectedness for the person. This is
not to suggest that, all things considered, the wishes of a competent patient ought
always be trumped by the interests of others. It is to contend, however, that many
discussions of euthanasia do not consider all things. Hospitals are wonderful places
for curative medicine, but they are not at all conducive to a humanizing experience
of dying.
The institutionalization of dying in our culture can be a profoundly alienating
and isolating experience for the terminally ill. There are, however, other venues for
care that can be more supportive of experienced social patterns of life, including
hospice and home care. Our culture needs to be much more supportive of these
venues, lest we drive the terminally ill to euthanasia out of a sense that they have
been abandoned. The dying patient may be beyond the realm of technological
cure, but our attitudes and practices must ensure that they are always within the
realm of human care, that their pain and suffering is an occasion for compassionate
bonding rather than social severing and isolation.
A third aspect of the moral self pertinent to the euthanasia debate is often
expressed in both theological and popular discourse in the metaphor of "playing
God." A principal thrust of this slogan is to suggest that deliberate choices for death
are an arrogant usurpation of authority regarding the manner and time of one's
dying. It is to encroach on the dominion of the powers beyond our control that we
experience as sovereign and ultimate.
Doing ethics by slogan inevitably risks distortion of the issue, and the problem
with this particular metaphor is that it appears to deprive persons of the capacity
for responsible moral agency with respect to all end-of-life decisions. On one hand,
the appeal to playing God seems to push in the direction of/atalism. viewing even
the occurrence of illness and disease as manifestations of the inscrutable divine
will. A provocative literary example of this attitude is to be found in Albert
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Camus's The Plague, in which the priest Paneloux accepts his lethal affiiction as
God's will and refuses to allow the physician, Dr. Rieux, to administer a potential
inoculating serum.7 Thus, providing technological interventions that alter the
natural course of the disease process might be rejected as a form of playing God.
Alternatively, the concern about playing God may be expressed in vitalism, an
attitude that requires all medical technologies, as gifts of divine grace, to be used to
prolong life and forestall death. In this view, a decision not to provide such
treatments is a pretentious usurpation of dominion over life and death by human
authority. Such an attitude was displayed in the recent Minnesota case of Helga
Wanglie, a persistently comatose, 87-year old woman whose husband refused to
allow her physicians to disconnect the respirator because of his wife's convictions
that "Only He who gave life has the right to take life."8
The problem with both fatalism and vitalism is that human beings are not
conceived as moral agents with decisionmaking capacity and responsibility.
However, the theological concern expressed in the playing God metaphor is best
seen as the presupposition within which we are called to exercise responsible
agency. While human beings do not have ultimate control over life and death, we
are accountable as stewards over our own lives and for the lives of others.
It is, moreover, in the actions contemplated in responsible stewardship that the
playing God theme can be a useful reminder of the constraints on our decisions.
The point is not that we should not make choices about medical treatment at life's
end, but rather that we should recognize such choices are made in the context of
our finitude and fallibility.
These inherent limitations of human nature are particular germane to public
policy about legalized euthanasia. We have limited predictive capabilities about
the outcomes of actions and policies that we initiate, which demands caution in
evaluating claims either that a social practice of euthanasia will be relatively
"clean," or that it will culminate in an ethos not dissimilar to that of Nazism.
Similarly, however many safeguards built into a social practice to regulate and
manage such a practice, we seldom are able to control the courses of action we
initiate. The Dutch experience with de facto toleration of euthanasia is especially
revealing of this point. The first governmental study of the scope of the practice
indicated that, despite a decade-long effort to establish professional guidelines
under which physicians would not be subject to prosecution for performing
voluntary euthanasia, 44% of patient deaths did not meet the strict criteria for the
practice.9
The context for our personal and social choices, then, is that of finitude
displayed in limited knowledge and limited control, rather than supporting
pretensions of omniscience and omnipotence. It is also constituted by our fallibility
and propensity for making mistakes, the magnitude of which is enormously
heightened in a practice of euthanasia, because any mistake is irrevocable. Recent
proposals for legalized euthanasia, as in Washington State, stipulate that the option
of euthanasia would be made available only to patients diagnosed with a terminal
illness, but medical professionals are the first to acknowledge that such diagnoses
are not infallible and that the duration of terminality cannot be specified by
imposing a rather arbitrary time frame, such as six months.
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The pitfalls of presuming that all our technology bas brought us certainty with
respect to the end of mortality are tragically highlighted in the story of Wanda
Bauer, a 69-year-old Colorado woman. In July 1991, Ms. Bauer was informed by
her physicians that she had terminal liver and pancreatic cancer. Returning home
from a hospital stay, she asked her son to retrieve a .22 caliber pisto~ which she
then used to take her life. An autopsy revealed that Ms. Bauer was in fact suffering
from a serious liver infection, both treatable and non-cancerous. IO
One could validly contend that the Bauer narrative is an aberration, and that a
legalized practice of euthanasia could incorporate procedural safeguards
(independent review panels, for example) to reduce diagnostic and prognostic
mistakes to the minimum humanly possible. Yet, the need for such procedures
concedes, in effect, the larger claim at issue here respecting human finitude and
fallibility. Indeed, the permissive or restricted nature of the procedures proposed or
constructed to compensate for human limitations will themselves reflect certain
understandings of human nature.
The Giftedness of Life

Perspectives on euthanasia also reflect conceptions of the character of our lives.
We may, on one hand, make claims of "ownership" over our lives and consider
our bodies "personal property," notions which fit readily within a paradigm of
self-determination. Yet, we also know that we are radically dependent on others
for our very existence and for the basic conditions - air, food, clothing - of
continued existence.
This sense of ultimate dependency often assumes a more religious
characterization of life as a "gift," as something of intrinsic value that we receive
from others, and not merely instrumental value with which we can do whatever
we please. Indeed, historically much theological objection to suicide focused on
how such acts expressed repudiation of the divine gift of life, and therefore
comprised a wrong, constituted as much by the sin of ingratitude as by a sense of
unjustifiable killing.
At first glance, "gifts" seem to have a fundamental dimension of freedom to
them. We receive them not because of desert or work we have done (otherwise the
gift becomes a "wage"), but by the generosity of the giver. Moreover, gifts
frequently are made in the absence of expectations of remuneration to the giver,
expectations that transform the gift into an inducement.
The paradox of gifts, however, is that we also feel, sometimes very powerfully,
that they create bonds of community with others, II and in that respect are not free.
We feel, for example, that certain attitudes towards the giver are appropriate, such
as gratitude and thankfulness, while others, disrespect, indifference, or ingratitude,
are not.
In addition, gifts seem to create a kind of moral imbalance between persons. It's
not merely that we seem to feel the recipient should hold a certain attitude towards
the giver, but the recipient typically feels some kind of inner imperative of
reciprocation. That doesn't entail (at least necessarily) a tit-for-tat exchange, which
in all likelihood would diminish the moral significance of the original gift and
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transform the relationship into a form of trade and barter. However, the recipient
commonly engages in some practices of response to the gift, such as the expression
of gratefulness, which can affirm a deep bond between giver and recipient. The
recipient may also indicate a desire to "make it up" to the giver at some future date,
implying again that some type of reciprocity can rectify the moral imbalance.
created by the original gift.
Part of the nature of gifts is that they come with "no strings attached," and so
once given, the recipient is in a practical respect free to use, transfer, or dispose of
the gift as his or her own. Yet, this practical freedom may not correspond to a
deeper existential reality, especially present with gifts of great value, of an
experienced responsibility to use the gift in a manner intended by the giver.
Indifference to the gift may itself be a form of ingratitude, and exchanging an
unwanted gift (a tie for Christmas, for example) for something we really wanted
may involve us in an embarrassing explanation, if not deception, should someone
inquire how we liked the particular gift.
Thus, our common parlance suggests dimensions in which gifts are,
paradoxically, both free and binding. The same features, I suggest, are embedded
in our discourse about life as a "gift." The sense of gratitude to parents, and within
a religious community to the ultimate Giver of Life, seems a basic, natural human
inclination. This gift, in an ultimate sense cannot be reciprocated, but we may seek
other modes of expressing gratitude, for example, caring for our parents as they age
and become increasingly dependent on others.
Whether we can use our lives in a manner consistent with the intentions of the
givers is a more complex question, yet also one of particular relevance to the ethics
of euthanasia. We would first need to know what the intentions in giving us life
were,12 and our parents may not have had any, or have such general intentions that
several ways oflife could satisfy them. Very specific intentions - "You will be an
attorney," etc. - can so limit the recipient's freedom that one's life will not be
experienced as a gift. Similarly, while theological communities affirm the
fundamental goodness of God's intention in creation, it may be unclear what this
implies for the specific actions of a particular individual.
As with many gifts we receive, our bodies age and deteriorate, and become less
instrumentally useful to ourselves and to others. That does not necessarily mean
either that the intrinsic value of the gift has been eroded or lost, or that a choice for
death while in the terminal stage of illness expresses ingratitude. Indeed, in such
contexts, patients and caregivers may talk about "giving up" the fight against
death, which presents two quite distinct meanings. It might suggest a despondent
resignation to one's demise, that all reasonable resorts to prolong life have (or will
prove) futile. However, "giving up" can also express a sense of responsibility to
return one's life and self into the hands of its ultimate Giver. On this latter
construction, it would be vital to preserve the relational value of "giving" rather
than "taking" life, such as through assisted suicide or euthanasia.
Suffering and Compassion

In addition to the argument from patient self-determination, a common
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justification for euthanasia appeals to the pain and suffering experienced by the
terminally ill, an appeal that converges with the strong emphasis in the moral
tradition of medicine to relieve the pain and suffering of patients. This imperative
seems especially appealing in a culture oriented to instantaneous technological
gratification, and from which we demand immediate relief from the vicissitudes of
life. In such an ethos, pain and suffering come to be looked upon as evils, perhaps
of an absolute kind
A set of assumptions about suffering are embedded in this argument that need to
be challenged both culturally and theologically. A first is its too easy identification
of "pain" with "suffering." What suffering seems to amount to is but an extreme on
the continuum of pain; suffering is simply unbearable or uncontrollable, or
perhaps unnecessary, pain. Surely, however, if biomedical researchers only apply
themselves more diligently, we can develop therapies that will bring suffering
under our mastery as well.
Yet, we know full well from our own experience that we can feel pain but not
suffer, and we can experience suffering without being in pain. \3 Though illness and
disease, and especially terminal illness, can surely be an occasion for suffering,
suffering is ultimately something more than a bio-physiological phenomenon; in
suffering, the integrity and identity of the self is threatened or called into question.
Such a conception of suffering tends to place it beyond the biomedical model,
however, as something that is not susceptible to curing or fixing by one or another
of the technological remedies at the disposal of caregivers. Suffering is in this
respect medically and technologically incorrigible; yet, it is precisely because we
can't medically manage suffering that its obstinate presence becomes an occasion
to affirm the rights of the terminally ill to euthanasia. We seek to solve the problem
of suffering by taking the life of the sufferer.
Such an attitude suggests that the modem medical enterprise simply cannot
accommodate suffering. It appears as an unmitigated, unredeemed evil that ranks
along with death as the mortal enemies modem medicine seeks to conquer.
Indeed, as the increasing public sentiment for euthanasia reveals, in some instances
death is the lesser and preferable evil.
This cannot fail to have its effects on the moral identity of medicine.
Paradoxically, even though the virtue of compassion is often cited as a motivation
for euthanasia, the failure of medicine to account for suffering renders the entire
notion of compassion morally vacuous. For compassion means to suffer with or
share in the sufferings of the other. Yet, such a virtue would have no moral point or
meaning when the elimination of suffering and/or the sufferer becomes a central
purpose of the medical ethos.
The problem here is that modem medicine, and our technologically obsessed
culture more generally, has simply lost sight of a central religious dimension to
suffering, namely, the tradition of meaningful suffering. That does not mean that
suffering is to be praised as a good, or that it is to be sought after. Dr. Rieux in The
Plague is surely correct to contend that it is preferable to relieve suffering than to
portray its excellence. 14 The point of this religious dimension, rather, is that even in
the midst of such an evil, purpose and meaning can be found and ascribed. We
cannot, then, simply consider suffering as always an unqualified evil whose
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presence is a symbol of our failure and whose mastery is our objective.
Historically, religious thought has pointed to three principal purposes for
human suffering: A punitive purpose due to sinfulness; a pedagogical purpose to
expand the character of the self; and a redemptive purpose to purify the soul. The
former purpose should not be a consideration in the case of the terminally ill, as all
will one day experience such a condition. However, the latter two dimensions of
suffering can be significant for both patients and caregivers. The ordeal of suffering
may bring knowledge and a cleansing to patients while providing an occasion for
compassionate stewardship by others. IS
The tradition of meaningful suffering could not be more at odds with a medical
ethos that seeks to eradicate all suffering. The late theologian Paul Ramsey, at a
conference on chronic illness, speculated that the purpose of modem medicine was
to relieve the human condition o/the human condition, with "human condition"
referring to the pain and suffering we experience as our common mortal lot. It is
worth asking, whether in the ideological drive to eliminate suffering or, if that fails,
eliminating the sufferer through euthanasia, we are not dehumanizing both
professional caregivers and patients.
The Good Death

It is well-known that the classical meaning of the term "euthanasia" refers to an
"easy," "painless," or "happy" death.16 In our century, however, such language has
become very problematic, because of the association of euthanasia with the
involuntary killing by the medical profession under the racist and eugenicist
ideology of Nazism. Thus, the recent Washington State initiative sought to
circumvent the terminological problem by proposing statutory language of "aidin-dying" rather than "assisted suicide" or "euthanasia" to describe the envisioned
actions of physicians.
It is nonetheless not hard to see that a conception of a good death is bound up in
the debate over euthanasia, as displayed by the popular slogan of "death with
dignity. "In our pursuit of technological mastery, however, we often seem to have
foreclosed the possibility of euthanasia in the classical sense without resort to some
lethal action. Indeed, as philosopher Margaret Pabst Battin has suggested, the
technological imperative behind modem medicine suggests our quest is not so
much for the good death as for "the least worst death."17
In the voices of terminally ill patients and their relatives, three principal features
seem to constitute the modem vision of the good or dignified death - a desire to
die painlessly, quickly, and in one's sleep. That is perhaps not surprising, given that
the public images of modem dying present to us persons who may be experiencing
great pain, for a protracted period of time, during the latter stages of dementia.
Thus, to avoid the "worst" death we may well seek alternatives such as assisted
suicide or euthanasia to ensure a comparatively better death.
Yet, such features perhaps are a comment not so much about death as about
dying, about a process rather than an event. While the fear of death may well be
still deeply embedded in our personal and collective psyches, it is possible to
contend that our fear of dying, of a painful, protracted, technologically-managed
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process that precedes death, has become the pre-eminent fear. Such fear likewise
plays into support for euthanasia, which appears as an alternative to avoid a bad
dying as well as a worst death.
Some, perhaps much, of that fear is uneducated and can be overcome with
more public discussion of dying and death..Persons who feel that diagnosis of a
terminal condition means being trapped by technology and abandonment to
strangers need to be informed about alternative measures of empowerment, such
as advance directives, and alternative venues of care, such as hospice. Perhaps
much of this education can occur through the instrumentality of the Patient
Self-Determination Act; for several reasons, however, a hospital is not the ideal
forum for such discussions, and more sustained efforts will be needed to counter
the prevalent taboo about death.
In such forums, be they private, institutional, or publicly-situated, religious
images of dying and death will be unavoidable reference points and can nourish a
rich discourse, and it will be important to trace out the implications of such images
and how they connect with sentiments regarding euthanasia. The religious and
medical notion of death as "enemy," for example, sustains the relentless quest for
technological conquest and mastery of death, and one consequence of that quest is
increased popular support for euthanasia.
Similarly, for many people in our culture, especially the young, death is
perceived as "the stranger" or as "the intruder." This is attributable in large
measure to our cultural practices of institutionalizing dying and death in hospitals
or nursing homes, which isolate the dying person from our midst. Few more
potent symbols could be conveyed about how dying means alienation and
abandonment in our culture, sentiments that also can provide fertile soil for
support of euthanasia.
.
An image of death as blessing or deliverer or even friend, by contrast, would
support a different set of attitudes and practices in our care of the dying. We would
perhaps be more sparing in our use of technology, and perhaps erode the stigma
and taboo of death that is reinforced by our isolation of the dying through an
accepting rather than adversarial relation to death.
My general point here is that our practices of caring for the dying are connected
with certain images of death embedded deep within our cultural ethos. These
images are formative of understandings of a good death in our society, and, for
better or worse, whether euthanasia is a means of achieving that kind of death. The
retrieval of these images for public discussion is a necessary part of our quest for
moral meaning and integrity in modem society.

The Relevance of Religion
The relevance of religion to public discussions over the ethics or the legalization
of euthanasia is often disputed. It is claimed that in a pluralistic society, any
meaningful public discourse about such matters must proceed from common and
shared premises, whereas religious traditions provide moral frameworks of use
only within the private realm of a particular community. This public irrelevance is
magnified when we focus particularly on issues of public policy, given that laws in
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our constitutional configuration must have a non-religious, secular rationale.
While valid in certain respects, such claims often suffer from a severe case of
moral myopia. This historical influence of ideas drawn from the formative
religious traditions of our culture is undeniable, and along with other moral
traditions, continue to shape that common ground we are so anxious to find for
public discourse. In a democratic society, religious communities themselves
constitute various "publics," constituencies that need to be taken into account in
policymaking. In such a society, religious communities and their members have
not only a right but a responsibility of citizenship to participate in such discussions,
though as "citizens," participants from religious communities are no less required
to seek a moral vocabulary that is accessible by fellow citizens (at least, if they want
to entertain ideas of persuading others to a different position).
Finally, in focusing above on certain "ultimate" questions embedded in the
debate over euthanasia, I have intended to suggest the presence of a deeply
religious core to the debate. The questions of control and empowerment, the finite
nature of the self, the dependency and gifted nature of human life, the place of pain
and suffering, and the moral and existential significance of death are common,
human questions, but also ones that historically have been vital to the moral
dialogue of religious communities. While in a pluralistic society, we may not agree
with the answers such traditions present on the issue of legalized euthanasia, the
ultimate questions they raise are unavoidable for believer and nonbeliever alike.
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